Lopez (Do Not Delete)

7/8/2014 2:55 PM

THE JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM
RACHEL LÓPEZ †
I. INTRODUCTION
After World War II, the rise of international human rights law has gradually
eroded what remained of national sovereignty, as a defense against the
intervention of other states. In the modern era, there is a growing sentiment that
when the gravest human rights violations such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes occur, the international community
has a “responsibility to protect” the victims of those crimes if the victims’ own
government is unwilling or unable to do so.1 While much of the scholarship on
the responsibility to protect focuses on the international community’s ability to
engage in military intervention to carry out its obligations, the doctrine actually
provides a menu of options that intervening States can employ to prevent serious
abuses of human rights, including diplomatic measures, economic sanctions,
and, notably for the purposes of this article, legal accountability in judicial fora.2
Thus, in the modern era, States have greater latitude than ever before to
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1. The responsibility to protect doctrine was first outlined in 2001 in a report commissioned by
the Canadian government.
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter ICISS Report]. In 2005, more than 150 heads of state
and government unanimously endorsed it at the U.N. World Summit. 2005 World Summit Outcome,
G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter World Summit Outcome]. Since
that time, it has gained increasing prominence as a guiding principle. Indeed, in September 2011,
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated, “Our debates are now about how, not whether, to implement
the responsibility to protect.” Garth Evans, End of the Argument: How We Won the Debate Over
Stopping Genocide, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2011/11/28/gareth_evans_end_of_the_argument; See also Jordan Paust, International Law,
Dignity, Democracy, and the Arab Spring, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 7-8 (2013).
2. ICISS Report, at ¶1.38. See also Ved Nanda, The Future under International Law of the
Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV 1, 5 (2013) (“The ICISS's
‘responsibility to protect’ concept comprises three distinct responsibilities: the responsibility to
prevent, the responsibility to react (which in extreme cases may include military intervention), and
the responsibility to rebuild after military intervention. The responsibility to prevent focuses on the
importance of early warning mechanisms and conflict prevention, and on the use of diplomatic,
economic, and military means to contain a conflict before it escalates.”); World Summit Outcome,
supra note 1, at ¶ 139.
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intervene in the sovereign affairs of other States when human rights violations
have occurred. Yet, the “when” and “how” of justifying intervention in any form
on the basis of human rights remains murky and States across the globe are
charting their own course through unsure waters. In this article, I will argue that
the United States has inconsistently fulfilled its responsibility to protect, evoking
this doctrine as a basis for intervention only when it has a national interest at
stake, and that this approach to human rights protection is improperly extending
to the judiciary.
This unbalanced invocation of the responsibility to protect aligns with many
of the critiques levied against the United States for its shifting commitment to
international human rights law more generally. Indeed, since World War II, the
United States has emerged as a controversial figure, leading the charge for the
development of international law but then failing to sign or ratify major treaties
that would provide accountability for human rights violations within its own
borders.3 The American approach to international law is even more striking
when compared to its European allies who have increasingly waived their
sovereign rights in favor of greater European integration and stronger
formations of international law.4 Critics have thus accused the United States of
American Exceptionalism – “the idea that the United States is different from the
rest of the world and unbound by the rules it promotes” – and have claimed that
the U.S. has co-opted human rights for its own purposes.5 While these critiques
primarily focus on the U.S.’s desire to exempt itself from human rights
enforcement at home, the selective enforcement of human rights law presently
extends beyond its borders, in part as response to the emergence of the
responsibility to protect. As will be explored further below, recent rhetoric by
U.S. government officials reveal that the United States is conditioning its
enforcement of human rights law abroad on the existence of a U.S. national
interest, thereby sending the message that state actors who act contrary to U.S.
interests are exceptionally more deserving of punishment for human rights
violations ― thus, effectively draping a veil of immunity over its allies. In
particular, U.S. politicians have repeatedly invoked this approach when
engaging in humanitarian military interventions overseas, most recently when
making the case for military strikes in Syria.6 In essence, the question of whose
3. Risa Kaufman, Human Rights in the United States: Reclaiming the History and Ensuring the
Future, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 153-54 (2008); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005). Douglas J. Sylvester, Comment, Customary International
Law, Forcible Abductions, and America’s Return to the “Savage State,” 42 BUFF. L. REV. 555, 612 (1994)
(“The United States has played a tremendous role in developing the current system of international
law, creating a body of law that is largely a reflection of American interests and philosophies.” Jed
Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 NYU L. REV. 1971, 1982 (2004) (“More than any
other single country, the United States is responsible for the existing international legal system, which
naturally makes it rather hard for other states to understand how we can act as if that legal system
does not apply to us.”)
4. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1981.
5. Id.; Austeen Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, and the Retreat from Extraterritoriality, 28 MD. J.
INT'L L. 101, 113 (2013). See generally JAMES PECK, IDEAL ILLUSIONS: HOW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT COOPTED HUMAN RIGHTS (2010); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479
(2003).
6. President Barrack Obama explained that the motivation for intervening in Syria “has to do
with not only international norms but also America’s core self-interest.” Interview by Judy Woodruff
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human rights deserve this country’s protection is becoming an expressly political
one, driven by national interest.
But the United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co. is striking evidence that this emerging American norm,
which I will refer to as “nationalistic human rights protection,” is creeping into a
realm where politics should have no bearing: the judiciary.7 In Kiobel, the
majority of the Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality8 was
applicable to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),9 a statute that courts had previously
interpreted to provide jurisdiction for civil suits seeking damages for human
rights violations occurring abroad.10 In arriving at this decision, Chief Justice
John Roberts, who delivered the majority opinion of the Court, emphasized the
fear that the adjudication of claims under the ATS in federal courts would have
negative consequences on foreign relations and “imping[e] on the discretion of
the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”11 At the
same time, the Court left open the possibility that claims could overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality if they “touch and concern the territory of
the United States. . . with sufficient force.”12 Thus, the Court foresaw instances
where ATS claims could have so strong a nexus to the United States that there
would be no doubt about its interest in the matter.
While the majority opinion suggested a need for a strong U.S. connection as
a condition for jurisdiction under the ATS, a concurring opinion, written by
Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan,
“interpret[ed] the statute as providing jurisdiction only where distinct American
interests are at issue.”13 These Justices favored the adoption of a clear standard
that would grant extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ATS, inter alia, when “the
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American
national interest.”14 Given the inherent fuzziness of the “touch and concern” test,
domestic courts may well look to this four-justice concurrence when determining
whether human rights claims under the ATS are justiciable. At least one court
already has.15
& Gwen Ifill with Barrack Obama, President of the United States, PBS News Hour (Aug. 28, 2013),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec13/obama_08-28.html. After
imposing a no-fly zone in Libya, President Obama explained to the American public that the United
States had a “strategic interest” in protecting the Libyan people from mass violence and that there
was a “price for America” if it failed to intervene. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President
in Address to Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-andvideo/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-speech-libya#transcript.
7. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
8. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory interpretation that
provides “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”
The canon’s purpose is “to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord.” EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
10. See generally, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659.
11. Id. at 1664. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)).
12. Id. at 1669.
13. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
15. Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013). See also Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic
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This opinion raises more questions than it resolves. Although the Supreme
Court adopted this threshold for the adjudication of ATS claims in US courts in
an attempt to limit “unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign
policy,”16 to what extent does this standard inherently require the judiciary to
intervene as a political actor on the international stage? Furthermore, if U.S.
courts, guided by the language in the four justice concurrence, dismiss cases
because they are considered to be contrary to U.S. national interest, would this
legitimize critiques that the United States is co-opting human rights to support
actions undertaken with political motives instead of humanitarian ones? In this
article, I will trace the emergence of the United States’ nationalistic protection of
human rights and examine the ramifications of the judicial adoption of this
approach to the adjudication of human rights claims. I argue that not only
would conditioning judicial human rights protection on national interest be
antithetical to the underlying principles of human rights, but it would also run
afoul of the political question doctrine. I further suggest that Congress should
correct this unclear and potentially problematic test by adopting a standard for
jurisdiction that would allow the United States to more consistently fulfill its
obligations under the responsibility to protect. Specifically, Congress should
adopt legislation that would allow U.S. courts to adjudicate human rights claims
under the ATS when other States who might be in a better position to do so are
unwilling or unable.
Part II describes the historical context that gave rise to the gradual
replacement of the non-interventionist default with the protection of individual
human rights abroad. In particular, it will focus on the development of the
responsibility to protect, highlighting how it provides a broad array of actions,
including judicial action, to protect individuals from grave human rights abuses.
Part III traces the role of the United States in the development of human rights
law and examines the critiques that the United States has used human rights as a
tool to pursue its own national interests, especially in its justification of military
interventions abroad. Part IV describes how Kiobel, if interpreted in line with the
four justice concurrence, represents a formal expansion of American
Exceptionalism into the judiciary and outlines why that violates the central tenets
of human rights law and the political question doctrine. Part V suggests that
Congress should remedy the problem created by Kiobel by adopting legislation
consistent with the responsibility to protect doctrine. Specifically, Congress
should universally provide jurisdiction in U.S. courts for claims under the ATS
when other States that are in a better position to adjudicate human rights claims
are unwilling or unable to do so.

of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 70 (D.D.C. 2013), reconsideration denied (July 12, 2013) (“Even though the
respondents in Kiobel had American corporate affiliates and allegedly orchestrated and incited
heinous actions against the Nigerian petitioners (including extrajudicial killing, torture, and crimes
against humanity), the Supreme Court concluded that there was not a sufficient nexus to the territory
or interests of the United States to confer ATS jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added)
16. Id. at 1665.
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II. THE BIRTH OF MODERN HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The effective international protection of individuals that reaches into the
borders of other countries is a relatively new phenomenon. In order to fully
understand the significance of the dilemma addressed in this article, this section
provides a brief history of its development. Specifically, it will trace how the
erosion of sovereign rights paved the way for the emergence of the responsibility
to protect.
A. The Erosion of Sovereign Rights in the Face of Mass Atrocity
The dilemma regarding when it is permissible for States to intervene in the
affairs of others to protect human rights is a modern one and States across the
world including the United States are still navigating its contours. In the early
20th century, a government’s internal treatment of its own citizens was relatively
insulated from the law of nations, with the exception of some notable
humanitarian interventions in the 19th century.17 Predominantly, however,
sovereign rights provided a veil of immunity that protected even the most brutal
governments from international scrutiny.18 International law offered limited
protection of individual rights, such as those of citizens of one country injured by
another country (e.g. international law governed injury to the property rights of
aliens, attacks on aliens on foreign soil, and the use of force against civilians and
soldiers during wartime).19
Yet, over the course of history, sovereign rights have been gradually and
cyclically eroding, with each grave breach of human rights that disturbs our
modern sensibilities further enforcing our global interconnection and
consequently instilling a growing belief in the duty to intervene in the affairs of
other nations to protect individual human rights. After the atrocities of World
War I, the international community increasingly recognized that a government’s
treatment of its own citizens could have implications globally and made efforts
to influence the activity of governments vis-à-vis their citizens.20 One step taken
in hopes of forestalling future devastation was the creation of the League of
Nations, whose aim was to curb the behavior of individual sovereign States to
act in the interest of the collective security of a community of States.21 Although
the League of Nations lacked binding authority over sovereign States and its
founding treaty did not explicitly mention human rights, it was the first major
chink in the armor of sovereign rights that eventually allowed for the
development of international human rights law.22
17. STEVEN RATNER, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 4 (2009); See also Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values, and
Functions, 216 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 12, 208 (1989). Concerning the
19th and 20th century inroads on sovereignty, see Jordan Paust, Nonstate Actor Participation in
International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 Va. J. Int'l L. 977 (2011).
18. Lorna McGregor, Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty, 18
EUR. J. INT'L L. 903, 913 (2007).
19. Id. at 4. See also, Paust, supra note 17.
20. RATNER, supra note 17, at 6 (2009); CYNTHIA SOOHOO, BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A
HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2008).
21. Id.
22. Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and
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The collective horrors and destruction of World War II ignited a desire for a
deeper codification of international norms promoting the protection of human
rights. Faced again with the distinct reality that those States who abused the
rights of their citizens were likely to present security risks for their neighbors,
States recognized that a firmer commitment to international human rights was
essential to encouraging stability and peace.23 In 1945, the Allied powers created
the “United Nations,” which initially included only those countries united
against the Axis powers.24 With the support of the United States, the United
Nations adopted a Charter that served as the founding document for the
organization and laid out a mandate to protect human rights. In the preamble of
the U.N. Charter, member States pledged “to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights” and “the dignity and worth of the human person.”25 Moreover,
Article 55 of the U.N. Charter identified human rights as essential to the
promotion of international peace and stability:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations . . . the United
Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language
or religion.26
The U.N. Charter committed its members “to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55.”27
Despite this bold language in the U.N. Charter its impact was limited by the
inability of the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a list of protected human rights
within the Charter28 and the affirmation of the principle of non-intervention in
Article 2.7,29 which confirmed the protection of sovereign rights. Additionally,
the conclusion by U.S. courts that the U.N. Charter was not self-executing further
constrained its practical application in the U.S.30

the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 533 (2002).
23. SOOHOO, supra note 20, at 23.
24. Kathleen Renée Cronin-Furman, 60 Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Towards an Individual Responsibility to Protect, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 175, 179-80 (2009).
25. U.N. Charter preamble.
26. U.N. Charter art. 55. The United Nations Charter was incorporated into U.S. law via 59 Stat.
1033 (1945).
27. U.N. Charter art. 56.
28. The list of protected human rights was articulated three years later in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which is considered soft law and non-binding on member States.
29. Article 2.7 of the UN Charter prohibits intervention “in matters which are essentially within
the jurisdiction of any State.”
30. See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950), aff'd, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d
617 (1952); Camacho v. Rogers, 99 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Frolova v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985). But see Oyama v. California, 332 US 633, 672-73
(1948) (Murphy, J., concurring, joined by Rutledge, J.); see also id. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring,
joined by Douglas, J.).
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B. The Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect
This slow march away from sovereign rights and toward human rights
during the past century paved the way for the emergence of the responsibility to
protect, which describes the increasing acceptance that States have a duty to
protect their own citizens from human rights abuses and when they fail to do so,
other States must intervene.
This section traces the emergence of the
responsibility to protect and describes the tools that States might use to fulfill this
duty, highlighting in particular the possibility of judicial action under the legal
theory of universal jurisdiction.
In the 1990s, the failure of the international community to intervene to stop
the genocide in Rwanda and the controversial humanitarian interventions in
Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia raised questions about when foreign intervention is
appropriate and catalyzed the formal articulation of the responsibility to protect
doctrine.31 In 2000, the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in his
Millennium Report to the General Assembly urged member States to “unite in
the pursuit of more effective policies, to stop organized mass murder and
egregious violations of human rights.”32 In response to this call, the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent body
established by the Canadian Government, published a report in 2001 that first
outlined the responsibility to protect,33 which it defined as “an idea that
sovereign States have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from
avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that
when they are unwilling or unable to do so, the responsibility must be borne by
the broader community of states.”34 While the report mainly focused on military
intervention, which it identified as the most controversial form of intervention, it
also indicated that the responsibility to protect included “all forms of preventive
measures, and coercive measures – sanctions and criminal prosecutions – falling
short of military intervention.”35
The ICISS specifically listed universal
jurisdiction as one of the tools in the “direct prevention toolbox,” stating:
[t]he Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (as well as the Convention
against Torture) establish universal jurisdiction over crimes listed in them. This
means that any state party can bring to trial any person accused of such crimes.
Universal jurisdiction is in any case held to exist under customary international
law for genocide and crimes against humanity, and a number of countries have
enacted legislation to give their courts jurisdiction in such cases.36

Thus, from its inception, the responsibility to protect included judicial
action as a tool that could be used to deter future atrocities.
The responsibility to protect next gained ground, when the High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change established by Secretary General Kofi
31. ICISS Report, supra note 1.
32. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, 47,
U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (April 3, 2000), available at www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.pdf.
33. Nanda, supra note 2, at 5. See also Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect,
48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 63 (2012).
34. ICISS Report, supra note 1, at VIII.
35. Id. at 8.
36. Id. at 23-24.
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Annan endorsed the principle, identifying it as an “emerging norm” in its report
in 2004.37 Still, the High-Level Panel noted that the responsibility to protect
represented a “normative challenge to the United Nations” in that “the concept
of State and international responsibility to protect civilians from the effects of
war and human rights abuses has yet to truly overcome the tension between the
competing claims of sovereign inviolability and the right to intervene.”38
In 2005, however, the U.N. General Assembly explicitly endorsed the
responsibility to protect when it adopted the World Summit Outcome.39 The
World Summit Outcome document affirmed that the international community
“has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means . . . to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”40 However, the World Summit
Outcome document watered down the responsibility to protect mandate with
respect to military intervention, indicating that the international community
should be “prepared to take collective action. . .should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleaning, and crimes against humanity” as
opposed to having an affirmative duty to do so.41
III. THE U.S. DOUBLE STANDARD OF HUMAN RIGHTS
As the responsibility to protect norm developed, States have been
navigating the difficult question of when it is appropriate to intervene militarily,
politically, and judicially in the domestic affairs of other States. The United
States has demonstrated marked inconsistencies in its approach to human rights
enforcement, at times pushing the boundaries of when it is acceptable to
intervene in the affairs of others in the name of human rights and at others
defending sovereign boundaries when their own interests are threatened.42 As
this section will further illuminate, the United States’ human rights policy has
been a combination of leadership and resistance.43 On one hand, the United
States has been instrumental in the development of international human rights
law; on the other, it has resisted the implementation and enforcement of
international human rights law within its own borders.44 For instance, the
37. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 ¶¶ 55, 203 (Dec. 2, 2004)
[hereinafter High-Level Panel Report]. See also Nanda, supra note 2, at 7.
38. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 37, at ¶ 36.
39. World Summit Outcome, supra note 1.
40. Id. at ¶ 139.
41. Id. at ¶ 139. (emphasis added)
42. Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & the United States Double Standard, 1 GREEN
BAG 365, 366 (1998) (“A recent example is President Clinton's support for an International Criminal
Court on the condition that its jurisdiction be severely limited. A primary reason for this was the fear
that U.S. troops and other U.S. government officials might be subject to the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
For similar reasons the President has resisted signing the Land Mine Treaty.”).
43. IGNATIEFF, supra note 3 (“Under some administrations, it has promoted human rights as if
they were synonymous with American values, while under others, it has emphasized the superiority
of American values over international standards. This combination of leadership and resistance is
what defines American human rights behavior as exceptional…”).
44. See generally, Koh, supra note 5; Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human
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United States has been a central figure during the drafting and negotiation of
numerous human rights treaties, but it ultimately failed to put many of those
same treaties into force within its domestic law (e.g. the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the Rome Statute, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)).45 When the United States has
ratified international human rights treaties, it has done so with so many
reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) that the treaties lost a fair
measure of force within domestic law (e.g. Genocide Convention, Torture
Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).46
Many scholars have thus lambasted the United States for its exceptionalist stance
on human rights, claiming that the United States believes that human rights is
good for other countries, but is wary of subjecting its own human rights records
to external scrutiny.47
A. The United States’ Role in the Development of Human Rights Law
American exceptionalism has been present since the birth of the modern
day human rights regime. When the community of Allied Nations contemplated
the development of the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson
proclaimed that the United States “puts human rights above all other rights” and
would fight to “make the world safe for democracy.”48 However, the United
States ultimately refused to join the League of Nations and retreated into
isolation.49 Henry Cabot Lodge, one of the leading isolationist voices, explained,
“We do not want a narrow alley of escape from the jurisdiction of the League.
We want to prevent any jurisdiction whatsoever.”50 The United States also
opposed the proposal to create a tribunal that would hold foreign officials
responsible for violations of “the law and customs of war and the laws of
humanity,” a would-be precursor of the International Criminal Court.51
Secretary of State Robert Lansing bluntly stated his rationale for the rejection of
Rights, International Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775, 776 (2001) (“For
a foreign observer, the policies and practices of the United States in the arena of international
relations are quite confusing. Its foreign policy fluctuates between the seemingly contradictory forces
of engagement and isolationism.”).
45. Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 366-68.
46. Id. at 367. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 344 (1995) (“By adhering to human rights conventions subject to these
reservations, the United States, it is charged, is pretending to assume international obligations but in
fact is undertaking nothing.”) But see Jordan Paust, Human Rights Through the ATS After Kiobel: Partial
Extraterritoriality, Misconceptions, and Elusive and Problematic Judicially-Created Criteria, 6 DUKE FORUM
FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE __ at note 151 (2014) (regarding the reach of Article 50 of the ICCPR).
47. Henkin, supra note 46, at 366 (“The problem is that the United States does not embrace the
international human rights standards that it urges on others. The United States systematically
declines to apply international human rights law to its domestic officials. All three branches of the
federal government perpetuate this double standard”); Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1973 (“Since 1945,
however, America has spoken out of both sides of its mouth on international law, championing
internationalism in one breath, rejecting it in the next.”).
48. SOOHOO, supra note 20, at 19.
49. Id. at 21.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Id. at 20.
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the proposal: “The essence of sovereignty is the absence of responsibility.”52
After World War II, the United States was a driving force in promoting the
reemergence of human rights as a guidepost for future relations amongst
nations.53 Legal scholar Jed Rubenfeld characterized the United States’ embrace
of international law after World War II as “part of an ambition to Americanize as
much of the world as it could, which meant both the export of American
institutions, including constitutional law, and the strengthening of American
global influence.”54 Indeed, President Franklin Roosevelt intrinsically linked
American ideals of freedom and democracy to human rights in his Four
Freedoms speech, proclaiming that “freedom means the supremacy of human
rights everywhere.”55 Eleanor Roosevelt also played a central role in the
development of modern human rights doctrine. As the chair of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights, she helped to draft the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and is credited with negotiating its
unanimous adoption.56 Still, even in the early days of human rights law, the
United States led efforts to restrain its force as evinced by Eleanor Roosevelt’s
speech before the General Assembly emphasizing the non-binding nature of the
UDHR just prior to its adoption:
In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary importance that
we keep clearly in mind the basic character of the document. It is not a treaty; it
is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a
statement of law or of legal obligation.57

After all, the Truman administration had conditioned its support of the
UDHR on its non-binding nature out of fear that African-Americans would
evoke human rights to challenge the Jim Crow laws in the South.58
After the adoption of the UDHR, U.S. support for human rights law waned.
In the early years of the Cold War, leaders in the executive branch saw little use
for human rights and instead waged a covert anti-communist propaganda war
against the Soviet Union.59 The Eisenhower administration worried that
supporting the enforcement of human rights law might lead to other countries,
particularly the Soviet Union, “prying around in human rights conditions in the
United States.”60 Despite these concerns, his administration still supported the
drafting of both International Covenants on human rights. Under the Nixon
52. Id. Secretary Lansing issued a formal dissent to the proposed development of an
international criminal tribunal and indicated that he did not intend to allow human rights law to
impinge on the sovereign rights of the United States.
53. SOOHOO, supra note 20.
54. Rubenfeld, supra note 3.
55. Franklin Roosevelt, President of the United States, Address of January 6, 1941, in THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 672 (vol. 9) (Samuel Rosenman ed.).
56. John Carey, The U.N. Human Rights Council: What Would Eleanor Roosevelt Say?, 15 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 459, 459-60 (2009).
57. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (1950).
58. PECK, supra note 5, at 17.
59. Id. at 18-26.
60. Dulles, United States Policy Regarding Draft International Covenants on Human Rights: The 1953
Change, (Feb. 19 1953) in 3 Foreign Relations of the United States 1555, (1952-1954) available at
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1952-54v03/reference/frus.frus195254v03.i0014.pdf.
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administration, the human rights agenda lost further ground as “realpolitik,” the
sense that the United States should pursue its national interest devoid of any
moral or ideological concerns, dominated U.S. foreign policy.61
In his
confirmation hearing for Secretary of State before the Senate in 1973, Henry
Kissinger explained the Nixon administration’s hesitation to pursue human
rights objectives abroad, stating that “the protection of human rights is a very
sensitive aspect of domestic jurisdiction of . . . governments . . . If the
infringement of human rights is not so offensive that we cannot live with it, we
will seek to work out what we can with the country in order to increase our
influence.”62 In practice, this approach meant that during this period the United
States rarely condemned human rights violations and frequently provided U.S.
aid to countries with terrible human rights records.63 Congress became
increasingly frustrated by the executive branch’s support of human rights
abusers and ultimately adopted measures that would restrict or deny foreign aid
on the basis of a country’s human rights record, which President Nixon
subsequently ignored.64
During the later years of the Cold War, the executive branch re-embraced
human rights as a counter-narrative to communism and accusations of American
imperialism as well as a way to improve the United States’ image after the
scandal of the Vietnam War.65 As Anthony Lake, the State Department’s director
of policy planning in the Carter administration, put it, “this human rights
business” became the “centerpiece of [the U.S.] effort to restore American’s postVietnam, post-Watergate image.”66 Indeed, President Carter announced that
“[h]uman rights [was] the soul of American foreign policy” on the thirtieth
anniversary of the signing of the UDHR.67
Similar to the Nixon administration, the Reagan administration first viewed
human rights as an impediment to pursuing the United States’ national interest,
but then later narrowly redefined human rights as supporting the American
values of liberty, democracy, and capitalism in order to accomplish his political
agenda of fighting communism.68 George H.W. Bush took a pragmatist
approach to human rights protection. He supported human rights, but only
when the political costs were low.69
Bill Clinton embraced human rights in a fashion similar to Carter. Before
Bill Clinton took office, he announced that “U.S. foreign policy cannot be
divorced from the moral principles most Americans share. We cannot disregard
how other governments treat their own people.”70 Under his administration, the
61. CLAIR APODACA, UNDERSTANDING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY: A PARADOXICAL LEGACY 3031 (2006).
62. Id. at 30.
63. Id. at 31-33.
64. Id. 33-44; see also Foreign Assistance Act § 32, Pub. L. No. 87-195.
65. PECK, supra note 5, at 45-46, 85-129.
66. IGNATIEFF, supra note 3.
67. Jimmy Carter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights Remarks at a White House Meeting
Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Declaration’s Signing (Dec. 6, 1978).
68. Apodaca, supra note 61, at 82.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 137.
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United States, as part of the Security Council, voted in favor of creating the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).71 The U.S. government
under the Clinton administration was instrumental in the negotiation of the
Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal Court (ICC).72 However,
President Clinton declined to sign the Landmines Convention73 and failed to
intervene during the genocides in Rwanda,74 one of the most gruesome instances
of human rights violations of our time.75
B. The U.S. Nationalistic Responsibility to Protect
The move away from sovereign rights and toward the responsibility to
protect in the early 2000s ushered in a new era of military intervention justified
by the protection of human rights, during which the United States’ pursuit of
national interest goals through human rights protection became more overt and
unilateral. Whereas before U.S. officials only considered the use of human rights
as a tool to accomplish national interest behind closed doors, during the last two
decades, the nationalistic protection of human rights has become explicit as
dramatically illustrated by the rhetoric surrounding U.S. military interventions
abroad.
Markedly, President George W. Bush, who was inaugurated into office the
same year as the ICISS report on the responsibility to protect was published,
evoked human rights as part of its justification for intervening in Iraq, an oil rich
country of significant geopolitical interest to the United States.76 In making the
case for war in Iraq, President Bush characterized Saddam Hussein as a
“dangerous man” who violated human rights and “used weapons of mass
destruction against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s people.”77 Paradoxically,
71. Jelena Pejic, The United States and the International Criminal Court: One Loophole Too Many, 78
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267, 270 (2001)
72. See generally, id.; See also Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal
Court: Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 57 (2002) (“The United States was extensively
involved in the drafting of the Rome Statute, and also in the preparation for and negotiations at the
Rome Conference.”).
73. Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1980.
74. See generally, PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998); SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE
AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002).
75. “While Rwanda may be the best-known humanitarian tragedy of the second half of the
twentieth century, Darfur may garner that dubious distinction for the first half of the twenty-first.”
Ralph Mamiya, Taking Judicial Notice of Genocide? The Problematic Law and Policy of the Karemera
Decision, 25 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 18 (2007).
76. President George W. Bush, Speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia: The
Struggle for Democracy in Iraq (Dec. 12, 2005). See also Brian Knowlton, Whatever the Weapons Result,
He Says, Saddam was a Threat: Bush Defends Iraq Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2004, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/28/news/28iht-prexy_ed3__1.html.
77. Bush, supra note 76. George Bush's Iraq war speech from the Cross Hall in the White House,
Mar. 17, 2003, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq.
See also Knowlton, supra note 76. Interestingly, this claim was based in part on reports that Saddam
Hussein had used white phosphorus against the Kurds in 1991, the very same chemical agent that the
United States used in the Battle of Fallujah in 2004. U.S. DEP. OF DEFENSE, POSSIBLE USE OF
PHOSPHOROUS CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY IRAQ IN KURDISH AREAS ALONG THE IRAQI-TURKISH-IRANIAN

Lopez (Do Not Delete)

7/8/2014 2:55 PM

JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

13

even though the United States formally recognized the killing that occurred in
Darfur in the early 2000s as genocide, it failed to intervene to protect the
residents of Darfur.78
Similar to the justification for war in Iraq, U.S. officials cited a confluence of
human rights and national interest concerns in support for military intervention
in Libya. As legal scholar Saira Mohamed articulated in her article Taking Stock of
the Responsibility to Protect, though intervention in Libya was championed as a
triumph for the responsibility to protect, it actually represents the endorsement
of “a responsibility triggered only when state interests align with that duty.”79
As articulated plainly by President Obama in his first speech after the no fly zone
was instituted, the United States is “naturally reluctant to use force to solve the
world’s many challenges. But when our interests and values are at stake, we
have a responsibility to act.”80 He identified those interests as preventing the
destabilization of the region, avoiding the flow of refugees from Libya to
neighboring countries, deterring other repressive leaders from committing mass
atrocities, and affirming the credibility of the U.N. Security Council.81
Leading up to the decision to launch military strikes against the Assad
regime in Syria, President Obama also tied his decision to intervene to
underlying national interests, stating that “if the Assad regime used chemical
weapons on his own people, tha[n] that would change some of our calculations.
And the reason has to do with not only international norms but also America’s
core self-interest.”82 Secretary of State John Kerry similarly evoked this
nationalistic approach to human rights protection. On August 30, 2013, when he
laid out that evidence that Assad used chemical weapons, he stated, “our
concern with the cause of the defenseless people of Syria is about choices that
will directly affect our role in the world and our interests in the world.”83
BORDERS,
available
at
http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19950901/
950901_22431050_91r.html; see also Peter Popham, U.S. intelligence classified white phosphorus as
chemical weapon, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 23 2005, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/us-intelligence-classified-white-phosphorus-as-chemical-weapon-516523.html. US
Used White Phosphorous in Iraq, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/4440664.stm; see also Captain James T. Cobb, First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour &
Sergeant First Class William H. Hight, The Fight for Fallujah, FIELD ARTILLERY MAG. 26, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/2-2AARlow.pdf.
78. Although the United Nations report did not conclude that atrocities in Darfur were
genocide, U.S. officials said that genocide had occurred there. See Glenn Kessler, U.S. Calls Killings in
Sudan Genocide, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html.
79. Mohamed, supra note 33, at 333. (“The clear emphasis of the justification was on the United
States— the capacity of the United States to intervene and the national interest of the United States in
doing so.”)
80. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to Nation on Libya (Mar. 28,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/presidentobama-s-speech-libya#transcript.
81. Id.
82. President Barrack Obama Interview with Judy Woodruff and Gwen Ifill, PBS News Hour,
August 28, 2013, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec13/
obama_08-28.html.
83. Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks on Syria (August 30, 2013), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/running-transcript-secretary-of-statejohn-kerrys-remarks-on-syria-on-aug-30/2013/08/30/f3a63a1a-1193-11e3-85b6-
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IV. THE NATIONALISTIC PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE JUDICIARY
Recently, the judiciary has intimated that it will follow the Executive
Branch’s lead and condition its protection of human rights on the presence of a
national interest. In 2013, the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co. issued an opinion restricting the ability of U.S. courts to adjudicate human
rights claims arising from conduct that occurred abroad to instances where that
conduct “touches and concerns” the United States.84 The four justice concurring
opinion in Kiobel further outlined specific criteria that would allow U.S. courts to
adjudicate human rights claims that arose abroad, explicitly including the
existence of a U.S. national interest as one ground for doing so.
A. Summary of the Holding in Kiobel
In Kiobel, the Petitioners, a group of Nigerians who now reside in the United
States, brought suit against Dutch, British, and Nigerian oil companies.85 They
alleged that the companies had aided and abetted the Nigerian military in
committing, inter alia, extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary arrests in
retaliation for their community’s protest against oil exploration.86 The suit was
brought under the ATS, a statute that was enacted by the First Congress as part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and grants federal jurisdiction over “any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.”87
The ATS was rarely used until 1979 when the Center for Constitutional
Rights evoked it on behalf of the Filártiga family in a lawsuit against former
Paraguayan official Americo Peña-Irala, who was responsible for the torture and
murder of seventeen-year-old Joelito Filártiga.88 The Second Circuit held that
torture was a “clear and unambiguous” violation of the law of nations and that
“international law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-à-vis their own
governments.”89 Since the Second Circuit’s landmark decision in Filártiga, courts
across the country adjudicated claims from the victims of human rights
violations world-wide.90
d27422650fd5_story_3.html
84. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
85. Id. at 1659.
86. Id. at 1662-63.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Ch. 20, §§ 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789); See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 878 (2nd Cir. 1980); Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1663 (“Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS
was invoked twice in the late 18th century, but then only once more over the next 167 years.”)
88. Complaint,
Filartiga,
630
F.2d
876,
available
at
http://ccrjustice.org/
files/April%201979%20Filartiga%20v.%20Pena-Irala%20Complaint.pdf. See Paust, supra note 48, at
Part III A (regarding four cases that addressed ATS claims in the 1790s).
89. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884-85.
90. See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009)
(Guatemala); Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004) (China); Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th
Cir. 2009) (Somalia); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011) (Iraq); El-Shifa Pharmaceutical
Industries Co. v. U.S., 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sudan); Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (7th
Cir. 2005) (Nigeria); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (Israel); Abecassis v. Wyatt,
704 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (Israel); Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2010)
(Iraq); Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Authority, 642 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (West Bank); Belhas v.
Ya’Alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Lebanon); Chavez v. Carranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D.
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Kiobel unhinged much of the precedent created in the wake of Filártiga. In
line with other recent cases such as Morrison v. National Australia Bank and
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown in which the Court has reined in
the exterritorial application of U.S. laws, the Court in Kiobel declined to extend
the ATS’s reach outside of its own borders under the facts of the case.91 It
unanimously held that the petitioners had no cause of action under the ATS for
violations of the law of nations where the alleged actions occurred within a
sovereign other than the United States, lacked impact on U.S. interests, and
involved a foreign defendant.92 A majority of the Court applied the presumption
against extraterritoriality, which is a canon of statutory interpretation that
provides that when a statute does not include a clear indication that it was meant
to apply overseas, it does not.93 The five justice majority opinion authored by
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the ruling reflected the “presumption that
United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.”94
While this language indicates a hesitance to act as the world police, the
Court’s stated rationale for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality
to this particular statute and its articulation of when the presumption may be
overcome signals a willingness to do so when it is in this country’s national
interest and has low political costs. Specifically, the majority opinion, reiterating
its opinion in Sosa, cautioned that “the potential foreign policy implications of
recognizing causes under the ATS should make courts particularly wary of
impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in
managing foreign affairs.”95 Moreover, the five justices in the majority explained
that the goal of applying the presumption against extraterritoriality in this case
was to “ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of
U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the
political branches.”96 In essence, although Kiobel involved a foreign corporation,

Tenn. 2005) (El Salvador); Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Bangladesh); Estate of Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, 611 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (Iraq); Estate of Manook v. Research Triangle Institute, Intern., 759 F. Supp. 2d 674
(E.D.N.C. 2010) (Iraq); Genocide Victims of Krajina v. L-3 Services, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 814 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (Croatia); In re Chiquita Brands Intern., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (Colombia);
Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473 (D. Md. 2009) (Peru); M.C. v. Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d 127
(E.D. Pa. 2011) (Moldova).; Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2007) (Dominican Republic); Doe
v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (Ivory Coast); El-Masri v. Tenet, 479 F.3d 296 (4th
Cir. 2007) (Macedonia and Afghanistan); Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
807 F. Supp. 2d 689 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (Hungary); Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776 (11 Cir. 2005) (Haiti);
Tachiona v. U.S., 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (Zimbabwe); Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Organ
v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008) (Vietnam).
91. Parrish, supra note 5, at 117-18 (“Kiobel is by no means unique. In a number of other contexts,
U.S. courts have begun to display a nervousness about being a battleground for foreign disputes.”).
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 127, 130 (2010).
92. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. (“We therefore conclude that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that
presumption.”)
93. Id. at 1664. (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 127, 130 (2010)).
94. Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
95. Id. at 1665 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727).
96. Id. at 1664.
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not a foreign government or official, the judiciary characterized the adjudication
of human rights claims under the ATS as a threat to US diplomacy and foreign
relations.
Still, the majority of the Court left some wiggle room when it concluded that
ATS claims could overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality if they
“touch and concern the territory of the United States. . . with sufficient force.”97
The meaning and application of “touch and concern” is not entirely certain. As
Justice Kennedy writes in his concurrence, “the Court [was] careful to leave open
a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the
[ATS].”98 Justice Alito characterized the majority’s test as “leav[ing] much
unanswered.”99 Justice Breyer’s four-justice concurrence similarly lamented that
the majority’s standard “leaves for another day the determination of just when
the presumption against extraterritoriality may be overcome.”100 Still, given that
the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in an effort to avoid
unforeseen foreign policy consequences that the protection of human rights
might occasion, claims where a national interest is present are likely to be among
those that “touch and concern the territory of the United States. . . with sufficient
force” to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.
While a careful analysis of the majority opinion suggests that the presence
of an unequivocal U.S. interest could be grounds for providing jurisdiction under
the ATS to hear claims regarding human rights violations abroad, the four-justice
concurrence by Justice Breyer states it outright. These four Justices expressly
“interpret[ed] the statute as providing jurisdiction only where distinct American
interests are at issue.”101 Justice Breyer specifically identified three factors that
would support an application of the ATS extraterritorially:
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American
national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important
American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the
United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal
liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.102

In light of the ambiguity of the majority’s “touch and concern” standard,
U.S. courts interpreting Kiobel are likely to look to the four justice concurring
opinion for further direction. At least one court, the D.C. District Court, has
done so already. In Mwani v. Laden, the D.C. District Court, guided by the
language in the four justice concurrence, concluded that the claim overcame the
presumption against extraterritoriality because “[i]t [wa]s obvious that a case
involving an attack on the United States Embassy in Nairobi is tied much more
closely to our national interests than a case whose only tie to our nation is a
corporate presence here.”103

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1669.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1673(Breyer J., concurring).
Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1671 (Breyer J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013).
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B. Executive Intervention in ATS cases
The briefs submitted on behalf of the Executive branch in ATS cases over
the last 34 years document a conversation between the executive and judicial
branches of the United States government.
While each individual
administration’s briefs reflect their broader human rights policy, a survey of
these briefs also reveal a gradual, though inconsistent, shift toward
understanding the ATS as impinging on foreign affairs. While courts in the
United States initially rejected the requirement of a U.S. nexus for the protection
of human rights advocated by Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush,
and George W. Bush, the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
finally legitimized this approach to ATS litigation in 2013.
When the ATS first came to be used as a tool for the protection of human
rights in Filartiga, the Carter administration filed submissions in support of
plaintiffs seeking civil remedies for violations of fundamental human rights
abroad.104 In response to a request from the Second Circuit, the Department of
State (DOS) under the Carter administration submitted a memorandum as
amicus curiae arguing that the district court’s dismissal of the case should be
reversed because torture constituted a fundamental and universally accepted
human right.105 The DOS reasoned that if there is consensus in the international
community that an individual right is guaranteed and a widely shared
understanding of the scope of that right, then “there is little danger that judicial
enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts”106 and “to the contrary, a
refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these circumstances might
seriously damage the credibility of our nation’s commitment to the protection of
human rights.”107 The DOS was careful to note that “it is likely that only a few
rights have the degree of specificity and universality to permit private
enforcement and that the protection of other asserted rights must be left to the
political branches of government,”108 a stance echoed by the Supreme Court in
Sosa nearly 25 years later.109 The DOS also emphasized that these were rights to
which “all individuals are entitled, regardless of nationality.”110 The stance
expressed in the memorandum as amicus curiae reflects the Carter
administration’s embrace of human rights in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate
era.
In direct contrast to approach of the Carter administration, the Reagan
administration filed an amicus brief in Trajano v. Marcos urging the Ninth Circuit
to affirm the dismissal by the federal district court of an ATS case against
104. Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, 33
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 773 (2008).
105. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-17, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).
106. Id. at 22.
107. Id. at 22-23.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (2004) (“[O]ther considerations persuade us that the judicial power
should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping,
and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.”).
110. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).
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Ferdinand Marcos, the former dictator of the Philippines who was residing in the
United States.111 The brief argued that U.S. courts should only have jurisdiction
when the concerned violations of the law of nations contravene rights and
obligations that form part of the law of the United States and have some nexus to
the United States, its citizens or its territory.112 At the same time, it stated that
relations between the Philippines and the United States would not be harmed if
the suit went forward.113 The Ninth Circuit in part relying on this statement from
the executive branch reversed the district court’s dismissal, but did not adopt (or
even address) the standard for jurisdiction proposed by the Reagan
administration.114 This amicus brief can also be seen as an expression of the
Reagan administration’s policy toward human rights in that Reagan supported
Marcos because he was an important ally of the United States in fighting
communism during the Cold War.115 In fact, when a coup was staged against
Marcos, President Reagan offered him exile in the United States.116
In line with his pragmatist approach to human rights protection, the
administration of George H.W. Bush Sr. did not file any submissions in ATS
cases during its tenure.117 During hearings on the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA), a statute which created a cause of action for torture and extrajudicial
executions, officials from the administration of George H.W. Bush opposed the
Filártiga line of cases and argued that a TVPA that provides exterritorial
jurisdiction when there is no nexus to the United States would risk provoking
retaliatory lawsuits against U.S. officials and create tensions with other countries
that could hamper the executive branch’s relations with foreign nations.118 Still,
when President George H.W. Bush signed the TVPA, he expressly supported an
extraterritorial dimension to human rights litigation in domestic courts, stating
that “[i]n this new era, in which countries throughout the world are turning to
democratic institutions and the rule of law, we must maintain and strengthen
our commitment to ensuring that human rights are respected everywhere.”119
When President Bill Clinton took office, the executive branch once again
supported human rights litigation in U.S. courts. In Kadic v. Karadzic, the DOS
and DOJ filed a joint Statement of Interest stating that the case did not raise any
political questions and encouraging the Second Circuit to reverse the district
court’s dismissal of a case against the President of Republika Srpska, the leader
111. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989)
(table disposition) (Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039).
112. Id. at 4-6, 9-13.
113. Id. at 32.
114. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 at 2.
115. Janet L. Sawin, A Study of Peaceful Revolution: The Philippines, 1986, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
181, 185 (Winter 1993).
116. Erin M. Callan, In Re Mr. and Mrs. Doe: Witnesses Before the Grand Jury and the Head of State
Immunity Doctrine, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 117, 119 (1989)
117. Stephens, supra note 104, at 791.
118. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the S. Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong. 11-16 (1990) (statement of John O.
McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice) & 22-29 (1990) (statement of David P.
Stewart, Assistant Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State).
119. Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 465, 466 (Mar. 12, 1992).
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of a self-proclaimed Bosnian–Serb republic within Bosnia–Herzegovina, for
brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and
summary execution.120 In Doe v. Unocal, in response to a request from the
district court, the Clinton administration stated that “at this time adjudication of
the claims based on allegations of torture and slavery would not prejudice or
impede the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with the current government of
Burma.”121
At the same time that President George W. Bush was pursuing military
intervention abroad in the name of human rights, he was also ushering in a new
era of hostile intervention by the executive branch in ATS cases, particularly in
cases involving corporate defendants.122 In these cases the Bush administration
consistently argued that the ATS threatened important foreign policy interests.123
In total, the Bush administration made submissions in ten ATS cases involving
corporate defendants; however, in a dramatic departure from prior cases, the
U.S. courts only deferred to the administration’s foreign policy concerns in two
cases, one of which involved a U.S. contractor.124
One illustration of this phenomenon was Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. In that
case, a Mexican national Humberto Alvarez-Machain, who was abducted from
his house in Mexico by Jose Francisco Sosa and other Mexican nationals with the
authorization of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) so that he
could stand trial in the United States for the torture and murder of a DEA agent,
sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the ATS after his acquittal.
When Sosa was pending before the Supreme Court, the Bush administration
urged the Court “to correct the fundamentally mistaken understanding of” the
Filártiga line of cases.125 Bush era attorneys argued that the ATS was a strictly
jurisdictional statute and did not create a private right of action in U.S. courts,
120. Statement of Interest of the United States at 1-2, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069).
121. Statement of Interest of the United States, Nat'l Coal. Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal,
Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (No. 96-6112), reprinted as Exhibit A, Nat'l Coal. Gov't, 176 F.R.D.
at 361-62.
122. Stephens, supra note104, at 792.
123. Id.; see, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628).
124. Id. at 773-74. (“Although the courts have emphasized that executive branch views are not
binding, they rarely rejected them prior to the presidency of George W. Bush. This historically
deferential approach took a dramatic turn during the Bush administration, when the executive
branch informed the courts that a series of human rights cases against corporate defendants
threatened U.S. foreign policy interests.”). In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the next of kin of Rachel Corrie,
an American human rights defender who was killed by a bulldozer that the Israeli government used
to demolish housing in Palestine, sued the American corporation that sold bulldozers to Israel. The
Department of State and Department of Justice under the Bush administration intervened as amicus
curiae supporting the district court’s dismissal of the case. In contradiction to its stance in Filartiga,
the United States argued that “[n]othing in the ATS or in its contemporary history suggests that
Congress intended it to apply to conduct in foreign lands.” Since the United States government had
provided Israel with the funding it used to buy the bulldozers, it agreed with the district court, which
concluded that a judgment against Caterpillar would impinge its discretion to sell military
equipment to Israel and “other allied countries.” Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Corrie
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-36210).
125. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 8, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339).
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that existing ATS litigation raised separation of powers concerns since it could
potentially interfere with the foreign policy matters exclusively entrusted to the
political branches, and finally that the presumption against extraterritoriality
precluded the adjudication of claims of human rights abuses that occurred
abroad.126
The Court agreed with the executive branch that the ATS was only
jurisdictional and did not provide a private right of action, but concluded that
“at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in
a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common
law” and that Alvarez’s claims were outside of this narrow set of claims.127 The
Court did not, however, entertain the arguments raised by executive branch
regarding separation of powers concerns or the presumption against
extraterritoriality in Sosa.128 In direct opposition to the Bush administration’s
insistence that it correct the mistake of Filártiga, the Supreme Court expressly
endorsed the “birth of the modern line of cases” after Filártiga.129
In Kiobel, the majority of the Court made an about-face when it issued an
opinion that applied the presumption against extraterritoriality and thereby
affirmed the approach to adjudication of human rights claims under the ATS
advocated by the Bush administration in Sosa.130 The Obama administration,
acting as amicus curiae, discouraged the Supreme Court from creating a
categorical rule for the exercise of jurisdiction under the ATS for human rights
violations occurring in a foreign country, but stated that “allowing suits based on
conduct occurring in a foreign country in the circumstances presented in Filártiga
is consistent with the foreign relations interests of the United States, including
the promotion of respect for human rights.”131
V. WHY NATIONALISTIC PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS PROBLEMATIC
The Supreme Court’s adoption of a nexus requirement, particularly one
guided by the presence of a U.S. national interest, is problematic on multiple
levels. First, the requirement is contrary to the very nature of human rights,
which are universal and obligatory as the Supreme Court recognized in Sosa.
This conception of human rights protection makes the United States fall short of
its obligations under international human rights law. Second, by adopting a
standard of selective jurisdiction based on national interest as opposed to
universal jurisdiction, the United States legitimizes critics that it has co-opted
human rights to accomplish broader foreign policy goals. Finally, if Kiobel is read
as requiring an inspection by the judiciary into what human rights claims are in
the United States’ national interest, it is inconsistent with the political question
126. Id. at 6-9.
127. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
128. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (“We therefore conclude
that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in
the statute rebuts that presumption.”).
129. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25, 731-32 (“The position we take today has been assumed by
federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided citing Filartiga….”).
130. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1659.
131. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1659
(No. 10-1491).
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doctrine, which precludes the judiciary from making determinations about how
claims may or may not align with U.S. national interest.
The Nationalistic Protection Undermines the Universality of Human Rights
The United States has adopted several human rights instruments, including
the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), that all highlight the universal nature of human
rights.132 Specifically, the UDHR, the CAT, and the ICCPR all describe how
human rights derive from the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”133 In sum,
these documents describe human rights as innate to our very nature as human
beings.
Previously, the United States considered the ATS to be one of the avenues
that it used to satisfy its obligations under international human rights law. For
instance, in its most recent report to the Human Rights Committee, a treaty body
that monitors state parties’ compliance with the ICCPR, the United States touted
its adjudication of human rights cases via the ATS as one of the ways in which it
fulfilled its human rights commitments, in particular its duty to protect
individuals’ right to be free from torture and other forms of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.134
However, the jurisdictional test for ATS claims adopted by the Supreme
Court in Kiobel may inhibit the United States from fully meeting its obligations to
protect human rights as defined by international law. The nexus test in Kiobel,
especially if interpreted as creating a national interest threshold for human rights
protection, undermines the basic tenets of human rights doctrine by implicitly
favoring the protection of certain people’s rights over others. Moreover,
conditioning human rights on national interest makes them dependent on what
region of the world a person lives, a person’s politics, or whether the interests of

132. When this article refers to the universality of human rights, it is referring to the principle
that all human beings by their very nature are born with certain rights. Please note, however, that
there is a separate ongoing debate about whether human rights standards can be qualified by cultural
differences. Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1997)
133. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, preamble.
134. FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS ¶ 185 (Dec. 30, 2011) (“In certain circumstances victims may also pursue civil
remedies against foreign officials in U.S. courts. For instance, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), codified at
28 U.S.C 1350, provides that U.S. federal district courts ‘shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.’ Since the decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), the statute has been
relied on by alien plaintiffs and interpreted by federal courts in various cases raising claims under
customary international law, including torture. In 2004, the Supreme Court held that the ATS is ‘in
terms only jurisdictional’ but that, in enacting the ATS in 1789, Congress intended to ‘enable [] federal
courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at
common law.’ In an amicus curiae brief filed in the Second Circuit in Filartiga, the United States
described the ATS as one avenue through which ‘an individual’s fundamental human rights [can be]
in certain situations directly enforceable in domestic courts.’ In that case, the United States recognized
that acts of torture can be actionable under the ATS.”) (internal citations omitted).
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their government align with those of the United States. In a word, it politicizes
human rights protection, which by its very essence should not be subject to
politics, and thereby legitimizes critiques that the United States uses human
rights as a political tool without a deeper commitment to its underlying
principles.
A judicially-imposed nationalistic threshold for the adjudication of human
rights claims is also contrary to the Supreme Court’s own articulation of the
purpose of the ATS. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the ATS was
meant to enforce international norms that are “specific, universal, and
obligatory.”135 To allow courts to pick and choose amongst claims of human
rights abuses that they feel sufficiently “touch and concern” the United States, in
particular if that determination is based on national interest, undermines that
fundamental principle articulated in Sosa. Furthermore, nationalistic protection
of human rights in the context of the ATS conflicts with the original intent of the
very Act that created it. The Supreme Court has identified the ATS as one of
several provisions in the Judiciary Act that reflect “a concern for uniformity in
this country’s dealings with foreign nations.”136 The nebulous standard adopted
in Kiobel might occasion the disparate treatment of cases according to a country’s
connection with the United States, thus conflicting with the original purpose of
the Act itself.
A. The Unraveling of American Universal Jurisdiction
Both the majority opinion and the four justice concurrence in Kiobel rejected
the understanding of various U.S. courts and legal scholars prior to Kiobel that
the ATS provided universal jurisdiction for conduct in violation of universally
recognized human rights.137 Typically, when a court exercises jurisdiction over a
matter, the claim must have some connection to the territory, national interest, or
a citizen of the State where the court sits, but universal jurisdiction is different.138
135. “Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
136. Id. at 427 n. 25.
137. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 404 (1987). See also, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing the provision that defines universal jurisdiction in the Third
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law of the United States as support for jurisdiction in that case);
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); and
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 n.25, 185 (D. Mass. 1995). Julian Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising
Death of Universal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AMER. J. INTL. L. 835, 837 (2014) (Despite
its prominence in Sosa and subsequent academic support, both the Roberts majority and the Breyer
concurring opinion rejected a universal jurisdiction reading of the ATS.”) Jordan J. Paust, Kiobel,
Corporate Liability, and the Extraterritorial Reach of the ATS, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. DIG. 18, 20 (2012) (“As
international law is the substantive law that is expressly incorporated, universal jurisdiction exists for
ATS lawsuits and has provided the primary basis for the extraterritorial reach of the ATS in cases
since the 1790s.”) But see, Curtis Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323,
343 (“As an initial matter, it is not clear that the international law theory of universal jurisdiction even
applies to civil liability. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law asserts that it does, but it
cites no support for that proposition.”)
138. Ku, supra note 137, at 835 (“When a state seeks to exercise jurisdiction outside of its territory,
international law generally requires a state to show some connection to its territory, nationality, or
national security interests. These limitations flow from fundamental international legal principles of
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With universal jurisdiction, “there is no link of territoriality or nationality
between the State and the conduct of the offender, nor is the State seeking to
protect its security or credit.” 139 The legal theory behind universal jurisdiction is
that some crimes are so “threatening to the international community or so
heinous in scope and degree that they offend the interest of all humanity.”140
Thus, a national court exercising universal jurisdiction does not act in its own
name uti singulus (a special interest), but as an agent of the international
community.141
The principle of universal jurisdiction was first applied to human rights
violations during the trials of Nazi officials after World War II. These tribunals
cited piracy as the first instance of the “Universality of Jurisdiction” and claimed
that this doctrine should be extended to war crimes as well.142 Other
international and national courts, including U.S. federal courts, and legal
scholars have also recognized piracy as the foundation of universal jurisdiction
under international law.143 Piracy is “crucial to the origins of universal
jurisdiction,”144 because it occurs on the high seas, outside of the jurisdiction of
any one state, and so jurisdiction is awarded to any State who can apprehend a
pirate.145 “Before International Law in the modern sense of the term was in
existence, a pirate was already considered an outlaw, a ‘hostis humani generis’
[enemy of the human race.].”146 In the present era, universal jurisdiction has
been expanded to include other violations of the law of nations that occur in
countries where the State is unable and unwilling to prosecute them.147 Like
sovereign equality and noninterference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states.”).
139. L. REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES,
5 (2003). See also Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien
Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 619 (2013).
140. Michael Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-State Party
States, 35 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 2, 363, 369 (2001).
141. Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 3, 596, 601
(2003).
142. 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 35, 42 (1947) (Brit. Mil. Ct. Almelo).
Cynthia Soohoo, Bringing Human Rights Home: A History of Human Rights in the United States 19
(2008).
143. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, The Principle and Practice of Universal Jurisdiction
(2010). See also United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (“[Universal]
jurisdiction had its origins in the special problems and characteristics of piracy. It is only in recent
times that nations have begun to extend this type of jurisdiction to other crimes.”); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 69 (Sept. 7) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Piracy by law of nations, in
its jurisdictional aspects, is sui generis.”); Eichmann v. Attorney-General, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. 1962).
144. PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN LAW & PUB. AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 45 (2001), available at
http:// www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf.
145. See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 450 U.N.T.S. 6465; see also
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 105, Dec. 10, 1982, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39
(1994), 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State,
every State may seize a pirate ship ... and arrest the persons and seize the property on board ... [and]
may decide upon the penalties to be imposed.”). See also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
153, 156 (1820) (noting that “pirates being hostes humani generis, are punishable in the tribunals of all
nations. All nations are engaged in a league against them for the mutual defence and safety of all.”).
146. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 609 (8th ed., 1955).
147. In the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law (1965), piracy was listed as the only
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piracy, these international crimes would otherwise escape punishment because
they occur in locations where the State has abdicated its responsibility to
prosecute. Thus, it is the responsibility of the international community to step in
and provide a jurisdiction of last resort, as explained by the Spanish Tribunal
Supremo in a universal jurisdiction case against Guatemalan generals accused of
genocide.148
The ATS shares the same historical origins and purpose as other universal
jurisdiction provisions. Indeed, U.S. courts have consistently evoked the
connection between piracy and human rights violations when finding
jurisdiction in ATS cases.149 For instance, in Filartiga, the Second Circuit
explained that “for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the
pirate . . . before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”150 The
Supreme Court underscored in Sosa that “when Congress passed the ATS, three
principal offenses against the law of nations had been identified by Blackstone:
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy.”151 The majority of the court concluded that other causes of action based
upon present-day law of nations may be cognizable under the ATS if the claim
both “rest[s] on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world
and [is] defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
[aforementioned] 18th-century paradigms [.]”152
Yet, the marriage of jurisdiction in ATS claims with the presence of a
national interest by the four justice concurrence in Kiobel undermines the
understanding of the ATS as a provision that provides universal jurisdiction and
instead reflects the protective principle of jurisdiction under international law
that provides jurisdiction over criminal offenses when they involve a threat to
the sovereignty of the United States.153 As defined by section 402 of the Third
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law of the United States, courts can evoke the
universally cognizable offense. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations added several other
universal crimes, such as war crimes and apartheid. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS Law § 404 (1987).
148. Guatemalan Genocide Case, STC 237/2005 (Spain, Tribunal Constitucional, September 26,
2005).
149. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 n.25, 185 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding, on the
basis of the piracy analogy in Filartiga, that torture is a “universal” crime and thus federal courts have
“universal jurisdiction” in an ATS action brought by aliens and an American nun against former
Guatemalan Minister of Defense alleging brutalities in Guatemala); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762. (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 204-8 (2d Cir. 2009).
150. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
151. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724; See also Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1666.
152. Id. at 725.
153. See e.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (“But the same rule of interpretation
should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their
locality for the government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own
citizens, officers, or agents. Some such offenses can only be committed within the territorial
jurisdiction diction of the government because of the local acts required to constitute them. Others are
such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope
and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by
citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not thought
it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and
foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.”).
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protective principle when jurisdiction is prescribed based upon “certain conduct
of non-nationals outside a state’s territory that is directed against the security of
the state or against a limited class of state interests that threaten the integrity of
governmental functions (such as counterfeiting).”154
Requiring that a human rights offense “touch and concern” the United
States in order to receive relief in U.S. courts, particularly if that determination is
driven by considerations of U.S. national interest, implies that when the United
States exercises jurisdiction in ATS cases it is not acting for the benefit of all
nations (in line with the principles of universal jurisdiction), but instead in its
own narrow self-interest. This exposes the United States to criticism that it only
uses human rights as a pretext to intervene in the internal affairs of others to
serve its own political goals. Moreover, as explained above, the ICISS report
identified universal jurisdiction as a tool in the responsibility to protect “toolbox”
that could be used to deter future atrocities. Thus, interpreting the ATS in a way
that precludes universal jurisdiction limits our capacity to meet our obligations
under the responsibility to protect doctrine.
B. The Judicial Protection of Human Rights as a Political Question
Some scholars like Jack Goldsmith offer a pragmatist viewpoint, arguing
that it is better for there to be selective enforcement of human rights by the
United States than none at all.155 While the wisdom of the political branches
intervening to protect human rights only when the interests of the United States
are at play is debatable, the political question doctrine precludes the judiciary
from making such determinations.156 The political question doctrine, which is
rooted in concerns over the separation of powers, provides that some questions
are best suited for the political branches to decide unencumbered by the
oversight of the judicial branch.157
As Justice Frankfurther famously
underscored, “Court[s] ought not enter into the political thicket.”158 In Marbury
v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: “The province of the court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or
executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the
executive, can never be made in this court.”159 The Supreme Court in Baker v.
Carr listed the six factors that may trigger the doctrine:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is

154. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 (1987).
155. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 373 (“A second possible response is that the United
States should stop enforcing human rights norms against other countries. Such a course would
alleviate any hypocrisy that inheres in the double standard. But it would harm the promotion of
international human rights. A United States double standard is in this sense preferable to no
enforcement at all.”).
156. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
157. Renowned legal scholar Alexander Bickel put it this way, “it is quite plain that some
questions are held to be political pursuant to a decision on principle that there ought to be discretion
free of principled rules.” ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 186 (1962).
158. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
159. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803).
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found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.160
Cases pertaining to foreign affairs often raise political questions.161 As the
Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative’the political’-departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.”162 While not every case involving a question of foreign affairs is
inherently nonjusticiable, those cases “frequently turn on standards that defy
judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably
committed to the executive or legislature” and “uniquely demand single-voiced
statement of the Government’s views.”163
Requiring the judiciary to weigh questions of national interest is squarely
within the realm of political questions that the doctrine was meant to preclude.
In fact, Justice John Marshall explicitly addressed this question when he was a
Congressman. In a speech to the House of Representatives, he explained his
view that the judiciary is ill-equipped to make decisions involving, even in part,
judgments about how our national interests align, because federal courts lack the
necessary information to evaluate foreign relations, the political accountability to
the public, and the power to enforce such decisions.164 Additionally, allowing
the judiciary to do so poses very real risks that the U.S. Government could end
up speaking with two voices, which would trigger one of the six factors listed in
Baker: “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.”165 Similarly, the “touch and concern”
standard is so vague and indefinite that judiciary could easily construe it in ways
that impede the discretionary powers of the other two branches. Interestingly, it

160. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
161. United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 4 L. Ed. 471; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307, 309, 7 L.
Ed. 415; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511, 517, 520, 9 L. Ed. 1176; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415, 420,
10 L. Ed. 226; In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 499, 12 Sup. Ct. 453, 36 L. Ed. 232.
162. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
163. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. See generally, Gwynne Skinner, Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now
Clearly Dead: The “Political Question Doctrine” as a Justiciability Doctrine, 29 J.L. & POL. 425
(forthcoming 2014) (describing how many lower federal courts have erroneously dismissed cases as
non-justiciable due to the political question doctrine); see also Louis Henkin, Is There a Political
Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597 (1976).
164. John Marshall, Speech (March 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 103 (Charles T.
Cullen ed., 1984). According to legal scholars Walter Dellinger and Jefferson Powell, Marbury v.
Madison reflected his viewpoint in that the Court determined the dispute to be judiciable because it
“primarily involved the rights of an individual rather than the duties and interests of the nation.” See
also Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall's Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 367, 372-74 (1999).
165. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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appears that the Supreme Court’s standard in Kiobel could undermine the very
reason that it applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in the first place:
to avoid “impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches
in managing foreign affairs.”166
VI. A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION TO KIOBEL’S PROBLEMATIC PRECEDENT
To rectify the problems created by Kiobel, Congress should pass legislation
that both creates universal enforcement of human rights law and is in line with
the responsibility to protect. As explained above, the responsibility to protect
mandates that States only intervene when the government where the violation
occurred is unwilling and unable to protect its citizen. Congress could adopt
legislation creating a similar standard for the adjudication of human rights
claims under the ATS.
Such a standard would be consistent with other courts that adjudicate
human rights claims. The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
for example, is guided by the principle of complementarity, which permits the
ICC to exercise jurisdiction only when the countries that would be better
positioned to investigate or prosecute do not (or at least not genuinely).167 As
provided by the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the ICC, the Court can
assume jurisdiction in two instances.168 First, the ICC will render a case
admissible when there has been no investigation or prosecution by the State
which would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned.169
However, the ICC allows the State to challenge the admissibility of a case on the
grounds that it is currently investigating or prosecuting the case.170 Second, the
ICC will exercise jurisdiction when the State is investigating or prosecuting a
case (or already has done so), but the ICC determines that the State is unwilling
or unable to do so genuinely.171
166. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727).
167. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 497 (2003)
(explaining that “under the principle of complementarity, the court must defer to national courts
unless they are unable or unwilling to prosecute.”).
168. Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 Crim. L. Forum 67
(2010) (explaining that the text of Article 17 requires a two-step test and that the first step – the socalled “proceedings requirement” – is an examination into whether a State is currently investigating
or prosecuting the case or already has done so.)
169. Id. at 71 (“Where there has been no investigation or trial in relation to the case, then none of
the these conditions for inadmissibility can be met, so the case remains admissible before the
Court.”). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, 18, & 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9 (Jul. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See also Situation In The Republic Of Kenya (Decision
Pursuant To Article 15 Of The Rome Statute On The Authorization Of An Investigation Into The
Situation In The Republic Of Kenya), Case No. ICC-01-09-19, par. 52-54 (March 31, 2010).
170. Rome Statute at art. 19(2)(b).
171. Id. at art. 1 & 17. See also Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain
Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the
Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, para. 78 (“[I]n considering whether a case is inadmissible under article
17 (1) (a) and (b) of the Statute, the initial questions to ask are (1) whether there are ongoing
investigations or prosecutions, or (2) whether there have been investigations in the past, and the State
having jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned. It is only when the answers to
these questions are in the affirmative that one has to look to the second halves of sub-paragraphs (a)
and (b) and to examine the question of unwillingness and inability.”)
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Alternatively, Congress could create an exhaustion requirement that would
oblige any plaintiff bringing a claim under the ATS to first seek domestic
remedies where the conduct occurred, similar to such requirements employed by
several international tribunals.172 For instance, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR), which hears cases against the United States, requires
proof of the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition for the admissibility
of a case. Under Article 31(1) of the IACHR Rules of Procedure, a petition is only
admissible if domestic remedies have been pursued and exhausted. Article 31(2)
however offers several exemptions to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic
remedies that amount to a “futility” exception (i.e. a petitioner may show that
pursuing domestic remedies would be futile). Specifically, a petitioner need not
prove that he or she exhausted domestic remedies if: (1) domestic legislation
does not afford due process of law for the protection of the rights allegedly
violated, (2) there has been a denial of access to or prevention from exhausting
the domestic remedies, or (3) there has been an unwarranted delay in rendering a
final judgment under the domestic remedies.
There is precedent for adopting such a requirement in the United States.
Another human rights statute that was recently adopted by Congress already
includes an exhaustion requirement. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,
which incorporated the CAT into U.S. domestic law, explicitly includes an
exhaustion requirement, which could be the basis for similar legislation
concerning the ATS.173 Moreover, the judiciary has indicated that it is amenable
to such a requirement. In Sosa, the Supreme Court noted that the European
Commission acting as amicus curiae argued “that basic principles of
international law require that before asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the
claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal
system” and that the Court would “certainly consider this requirement in an
appropriate case.”174 The adoption of an exhaustion requirement would be
another means to ensuring the universal protection of human rights under the
ATS, which would be consistent with international law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The erosion of the sovereign rights and the development of the
responsibility to protect has resulted in a dilemma concerning when foreign
nations can legitimately intervene to protect the civilian populations of other
countries that is unique to this century. Although critiques of the United States

172. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
35(1) (Nov. 4, 1950), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (“The
Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to
the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date
on which the final decision was taken.”); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 46(1)(a), 9
I.L.M. 673, 687 (Apr. 8, 1970) (requiring that remedies under domestic law have been pursued and
exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law).
173. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, § 2(b), 106 Stat. 73. (“A court shall decline to hear a
claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the
place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”).
174. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733, note 21. See also Brief for European Commission as Amicus Curiae 24,
n. 54 (citing I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 472–481 (6th ed.2003)).
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have long centered on its inconsistent adherence to and enforcement of human
rights law, never before has the United States so explicitly and publicly
acknowledged its nationalistic protection of human rights. While the rhetoric of
U.S. officials concerning military intervention is the most salient example of the
national interest threshold for human rights enforcement, recently it has also
seeped into the judiciary. While it still remains to be seen how the “touch and
concern” test in Kiobel will be interpreted, if the four justice concurrence is any
indication, the issue may turn on the United States’ national interest in
adjudicating the claim. This approach to human rights protection is inconsistent
with the basic principles of human rights, the responsibility to protect, and the
Supreme Court’s articulation of the function of the ATS. It also raises concerns
with respect to the political question doctrine, which precludes the judiciary
from deciding questions that are best left to the discretion of the political
branches such as determinations regarding this country’s national interest. To
cure these problems with Kiobel, Congress should adopt legislation that provides
for jurisdiction under the ATS when States where the abuses occurred are
unwilling and unable to adjudicate claims arising from them.

